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network security and the networked controller is no longer available. Therefore, the design of NCSs under consideration of network attacks is extremely urgent ( [6, 7] ). A most common network attack style is so-called denial of service (DoS).
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DoS attacks usually prevent the information exchange through a large volume invalid data to deliberately consume the network resources. Control problems in the presence of network attacks have been discussed in some recent works, such as in [8, 9, 11, 12] . On the one hand, an attacker would do it best to degrade the performance of the NCSs from the perspective of their own. In the 15 scenario that DoS occurred during the data transmission between sensor and remote estimator with energy constraints, an optimal attack schedules that to maximize the expected average estimation error is studied in [9] . Considering the limitation of attackers, a feedback controller that maximize a given function subjected to safety and power constraints is designed for a class of DoS attack 20 models in [13] . A two-player zero-sum stochastic game is formulated to model the dynamic interactions between a jammer (attacker) and a sensor transmitter (defender) in [14] . On the other hand, the stability of NCS should be guaranteed when attack occurred from the perspective of controller design. For a signalinput remote control system, a control strategy with placing poles method is 25 studied under the periodic DoS attack in [8] . Under a certain condition of frequency and duration of DoS, the input-to-state stability for the closed loop is analyzed in [11] . A hidden Markovian model which is used to describe the attacker jams the control packets stochastically and the stability problem are investigated in [15] . However, there are few works on the stochastic consecutive 30 packets dropout, these issues motivate the current study.
Generally, the attacker's purpose is to prevent the updating of control signal for the DoS attacks. That is to say, packet dropout would occur due to the DoS attacks and induce the instability of the control systems by denying the communication of control signal. Traditionally, the robust control strategies 35 which only consider the worst case of QoS (Quality of Service) are often used to stabilize the NCSs. However, these robust controllers are deemed to lack of flexibility and adaptability. So, more flexible control strategies which can settle the stability problem of the NCSs with the consideration of the concrete behaviors of packets dropout should be designed. Contributions to this topic 40 in the NCSs have been reported in [17, 18, 19, 20] . The stability and its controller design of networked control systems with both arbitrary and Markovian packet losses are established via a packet-loss depended Lyapunov approach in [16] . For a class of continuous-time and discrete-time Markovian jump linear system (MJLS) with partly unknown transition probabilities, the stability and 45 stabilization problems are investigated in [18] . Without the knowledge of all the transition probabilities, packet-loss-dependent switching controllers which considered both the packet-loss and time delay are designed in [19] . However, network attacks are ignored in the above mentioned works. These motivates the current study.
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The objective of this paper is to design a resilient control strategy to resist the DoS attacks for a class of NCSs. Different from the single robust controller, we aim to find a group of controllers to deal with varying degrees of DoS attacks, resiliently. In fact, the packets dropout can be seen as the results of game between attack and defense. However, these results are stochastic and can be 
Problem Formulation

75
In this section, the problem of secure control for discrete-time linear system is formulated under consideration of the stochastic characteristic of the DoS attacks.
A typical scenario of an NCS under the DoS attack and the stochastic feedback noise is depicted in Fig. 1 . The plant in Fig.1 is
where 
where
Aτ dτ and γ 0 represents there is no DoS attack.
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In ideal network state, the sensor and control signal can be updated every can be adopted to obtain the discrete-time system by [21, 22] . So, if there are i-consecutive packets dropout, the forms of discrete-time system are as follows
Aτ dτ . And, the subsystem γ i can jump to the subsystem γ j in Markov transition probability for all i, j ∈ S.
According to [15] 
where the transition probability represents that packets dropout shift from i to j if attacker adopt attack strategy a i and the defender adopt defend strategy
will be denoted as p ij for simplicity.
Thus, two categories of the transition probability matrix are shown (I) Full-information transition probability matrix which represents these all 115 known games behavior can be obtained completely
where p ij ≥ 0 and
(II) Partial-known transition probability matrix which represents only partial games behavior are known can be obtained
where p ij are known transition probabilities as in (5) and X are unknown transition probabilities.
Remark 1:
If the effect of attack strategy a i and defense strategy d j are not clear, we have reason to modeling them to the unknown probability. In addition, in order to perceived the real-time information of packets dropout, the TCP-based platform with acknowledgment mechanism should be adopted.
To make the proposed model more suitable for practical purpose, the uncertain of state should be considered. Here, the controller including the uncertain of state (refer to [23] ) can be designed as the following forms
where v ki is independent Gaussian white noise for state components with
Integrating the equations (3) and (7), one has
Under the controller (7), the following control objective is expected to achieve holds:
For convenience, the following useful lemma should be pre-presented: 
Remark 2: System (2) represents the condition that there is no DoS attack happened. From the description above, it is easy to know that system (3) involves system (2) as a special case. Because the final result of DoS attacks is the lack of control packets due to network blocked, the actuator channel we 145 only considered in this paper has it certain representativeness. Moreover, both the DoS attacks in control loop and the stochastic noise in feedback loop are considered in this paper, which is different from the aforementioned works in [16, 21] .
Resilient control under DoS attacks
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In this section, four Theorems are provided for stability and stabilization for the studied system with the DoS attacks. In the subsection 3. 
Resilient control with full-known transition probabilities
In this subsection, we address the case where the full transition probabilities 
Proof: Let γ i = i. Constructing the following attack sequence-dependent Lyapunov function
which represents the uncertain of state
As well known, the covariance 170 is usually to describe the dispersion degree of random variables, then, the uncertain of state can be measured by
Therefore, for each definite symmetry matrices P j > 0, we compute the expectation for each subsystem j which obey the Markovian transition probabilities as follows
for all γ i ∈ S holds, the system is considered as stable.
where λ min {⋆} is the minimum eigenvalue of matrix ⋆, then the following inequality holds
for all γ i ∈ S.
Combining (9), (13) and (14), the system (8) is stochastic stable.
Proof completed.
185
Theorem 2. For the attack sequence γ i ∈ S which modulated by Markov transition probabilities (4), the closed system (8) is stochastic stable if there exist positive definite symmetry matrices
The resilient controller gain with attack sequence γ i can be obtained by
i .
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Proof: According to the (11), the following inequality is hold by exploiting
and pre-and-post multiplying both side of (16) with diag{P
and Y i = K γi X i ,we can obtain (15).
Proof completed. 
Resilient control with partial-known transition probabilities
In this subsection, we address the case where the only part known transition probabilities of the DoS attacks are known in the design of resilient controller for the studied system.
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For convenience, we first denote the following notations. If the transition probabilities p ij due to attack sequence γ i ∈ S are known in the ith row, we denote it as
If the transition probabilities p ij due to attack sequence γ i ∈ S are part known in the ith row, we denote it as 
Proof: According to (11) and 
Proof: According to the (19) and (20) , the following inequalities are hold by
Similar to Theorem 2, define X i = P
−1 i
and pre-and-post multiplying both side of (21) and (22) with diag{P (21) and (22).
An example
235
In this section, under three different DoS attack scenes, a numerical example is given to show the validity of the proposed theoretical results.
Considering the continue-time system in [16] 
Suppose there is DoS attacks in the networked control of the system ( probabilities are large enough. This implies that: the more knowledge about two sides of attack and defense, the efficient for our designed resilient controller.
Conclusion
In this paper, a resilient control problem of networked control systems under DoS attacks has been addressed. When the attacker jam the control packets and how to compensate these packets dropout in the scene of DoS attacks are left for our future study.
